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Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how fixed-share 
prices, as a structural flaw in private equity funds targeted to small-unit 
investors, economically disadvantages those investors in favor of sponsors. 
Design/methodology/approach - The theoretical model incorporates fixed 
share prices with continuous investment opportunity and evaluates the 
wealth transfer from long-term investors to marketing affiliates and soliciting 
dealers in the form of fees paid on the sale of shares to follow-on investors. 
Findings - This result holds in the presence of high-payout dividend policy 
that attempts to compensate for wealth transfer. 
Research limitations/implications - Should share prices be marked-to-market 
using real estate appraisals or another method, the unlisted REIT and related 
offerings, such as tenant-in-common funds, will be profitable for sponsors 
without economically disadvantaging long-term investors. Practical 
implications - The findings from this research are useful to fund sponsors 
who design real estate investment products for small-unit investors. These 
products may retain the advantageous characteristics of existing products 
while eliminating the disadvantageous features. Originality/value - This is the 
first academic research on private equity capital raised from small-unit 
investors. 
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1. Introduction 
 Private equity funding of institutional-grade commercial real estate in 
the US has historically come from wealthy individuals and pension funds. 
These sources remain dominate today as evidenced by the recent wave of 
real estate public-to-private transactions. Small-unit investors were provided 
the opportunity to purchase shares in publicly-traded portfolios of 
commercial real estate in 1960 in the US when the first REIT law was enacted 
and now in many countries throughout the world as the REIT concept 
proliferates. 
 During the early 1990s, real estate fund sponsors in the US began 
raising equity for commercial real estate investment using broker-dealer 
channels. Replicating dividend networks established by mutual fund groups, 
sponsors offer real estate investment programs to the population of mostly 
small-unit investors who rely on the services of financial planners. Sponsors 
using broker-dealer networks to raise equity capital begin as private 
companies. While sometimes referred to as “private REITs”, a select group of 
these companies and the mini-industry that now surrounds them, prefer the 
title “unlisted REIT” because sponsors follow the SEC’s rules for publicly-
traded REITs, but do not list shares on exchanges[1]. The success of the 
unlisted REIT approach is evidenced by the relatively high volume of equity 
flows to these companies, sometimes resulting in near-parity with inflows to 
publicly-traded REITs. During 2003, for example, the unlisted REIT group, 
raised $7 billion through broker-dealer channels while all publicly-traded 
REITs raised $8.1 billion through public stock offerings [2]. Similar broker-
dealer networks are now used in the in US to facilitate tax-free exchanges 
through tenant-in-common (TIC) funds [3]. 
 
1.1 Unintended consequences for unlisted REIT investors 
 The emergence of unlisted REITs as highly visible participants in the 
commercial real estate markets may be the result of small-unit investors 
rationally responding to the attractive investment opportunities offered by 
these firms. Yet, some members of the financial press and executives of 
publicly-traded REITs question the methods used by unlisted REITs (Smith, 
2003a, b; Fitch, 2003; Ostrowski, 2004; Farrell, 2006). Criticisms center on the 
adverse effects of aggressive fees (i.e. often 10 percent to 15 percent) 
deducted from investor contributions and paid to financial planners and 
sponsors. To a lesser extent, criticisms focus on structural characteristics of 
the ongoing contractual relation between investors and sponsors. 
 Unlisted REITs sell shares at a price (i.e. typically $10) that either 
remains fixed or may be modestly adjusted throughout investors’ holding 
periods[4]. This feature differentiates unlisted REITs from publicly-traded 
REITs and is frequently cited by sponsors and broker-dealers as an advantage 
of the unlisted REIT structure. Small-unit investors, as the argument goes, 
find the volatility of public REIT prices undesirable, and therefore feel more 
secure with a relatively high dividend paying investment in which the share 
price remains constant. As Fitch (2003) notes, the apparent advantage of a 
fixed-price structure may instead represent a disadvantage to investors 
because they cannot share in appreciation without asset liquidation or 
company sale. 
 In this paper, we argue that the fixed price feature of unlisted REITs 
potentially has more serious negative financial consequences for investors 
who contribute capital early in the funding cycle. After controlling for 
dividend payout, we demonstrate that fixed share prices with continuous 
investment opportunity adversely affects long-term investors by transferring 
wealth to unlisted REIT affiliates and soliciting dealers in the form of fees paid 
on the sale of shares to follow-on investors. This contractual feature 
represents a flaw in the unlisted REIT structure with several detrimental 
consequences. These consequences, as we argue, place in jeopardy the long-
term viability of unlisted REITs that rely on fixed share price structures. 
Higher dividend payout moderates the wealth transfer from initial investors, 
but also exacerbates the financial stress experienced by unlisted REITs that 
distribute more money than current cash flow, as we show later in the paper. 
Should unlisted REITs elect to periodically mark share prices to market using 
either real estate appraisals (following commingled funds) or some other 
method, the unlisted REIT business will continue without economically 
disadvantaging long-term investors. 
 The balance of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the institutional details about the unlisted REIT business. We develop an 
economic modeling structure in section 3. This model allows for examinations 
of investment returns and the profit opportunities available to two classes of 
investors - long-term investors and follow-on investors. In section 4, we use 
the model along with a set of assumed parameter values to study the 
outcomes for both classes of investors when follow-on investment is 
prohibited and when follow-on investors operate in a competitive 
environment. The conclusion, presented in section 5, describes how the fixed 
share price arrangement creates incentives for continuous selling of unlisted 
REIT shares, asymmetrical participation in real estate value changes, and the 
wealth transfer that occurs from long-term investors to unlisted REIT 
affiliates and soliciting dealers. We also make recommendations for altering 
the unlisted REIT structure. 
 
2. Institutional detail 
 Because no published papers have appeared on unlisted REITs, we 
provide selected institutional details about how these businesses operate [5]. 
As shown in Figure 1, the ownership entity is embedded in a fairly complex 
network of relationships with service providers and regulators. The chain that 
connects REITs to investors is our main interest. This chain begins with the 
establishment of an in-house broker-dealer affiliate that develops contractual 
relationships with national and regional managing dealers (e.g. A.G. Edwards, 
UBS Warburg, and Paine Webber). Local financial planners acting as soliciting 
dealers with or without affiliations to these national and regional broker-
dealers then sell investment programs of unlisted REITs to the public. 
Managing brokers may acquire due diligence reports from third-party 
companies that inform about the capability, competency, and integrity of 
unlisted REIT sponsors prior to agreeing to sell their investment programs. 
 Individuals invest as little as $1,000 after being given the prospectus 
of an unlisted REIT. The investment of $1,000 is reduced by the fees owed to 
the network including the in-house broker-dealer company. For example, 
with a 10 percent fee, $900 is actually invested in real estate. Investment 
programs qualify as securities and therefore must conform to the 
requirements of the SEC, NASAA (in most states), and NASD. Also, the actions 
of broker-dealers in their relations with the public must conform to NASAA 
requirements and are regulated by NASD. External advisors - usually 
subsidiaries of unlisted REITs - carry out day-to-day operations including 
relationship management with regulators, attorneys, and accountants [6]. 
Unlisted REIT prospectuses contain language about how companies will exit 
their current form to provide investors with a return of capital. Sometime the 
language gives a specific date (i.e. on or before). In other instances the 
language gives the unlisted REIT considerable flexibility for this exit. As shown 
in Figure 1, four alternative exit events could occur - private market 
liquidation of properties, exchange listing, IPO as the combination of 
exchange listing with public capital infusion, and merger with an existing 
company. Unlisted REITs may hope to capitalize on a favorable private-
market-to-public-market arbitrage opportunity during latter stages of the 
investment period. 
Figure 1: Unlisted REIT business and regulatory relationships  
 
 2.1 Investor appeal and criticisms 
 Logic suggests that the sizeable flow of equity capital recently moving 
into unlisted REITs occurred because the investment programs offered by 
these firms contained features appealing to individual investors. The features 
touted by proponents as being attractive to investors include: 
 High dividend. Unlisted REITs promise an annual dividend of between 
six percent and 7.75 percent based on capital contributed. During 
recent years, this dividend payout ratio dominated the dividend from 
alternative investment programs available through financial planners. 
As we discuss in section 5, unlisted REIT payout ratios typically 
exceed 100 percent of FFO, while listed REIT payout ratios 
approximate 70 percent of FFO. 
 Collateral. While individual investors receive no guarantees that 
dividend payments will continue throughout the planned investment 
period, they recognize that their money is placed in assets with an 
active secondary trading market should liquidation become 
necessary. Also, as sponsoring companies continue to grow larger, a 
signal of increasing financial strength is sent to investors. 
 Return of capital. Although redemption policies are restrictive, the idea 
of a planned exit written into the prospectus provides assurances to 
investors that sponsors would execute an exit that will return capital. 
 Fixed share prices. Individual investors who are drawn to investing in 
institutional grade real estate, yet fear the volatility of publicly-traded 
REIT prices, are provided with the opportunity to place money with 
high quality real estate companies at fixed share prices. 
Critics contend that the costs of features investors find attractive about 
unlisted REITs relative to publicly-traded REITs seem excessive. The features 
critics cite as being unattractive to investors include: 
 Selling, service, and acquisition fees. The selling, service, and 
acquisition fees paid to unlisted REIT affiliates and soliciting dealers 
are typically in the range of ten percent to 15 percent of initial 
investments, a fee structure some critics view as overly aggressive. 
Fitch (2003), for example, presents a table showing that the average 
fee from a $10,000 investment in an unlisted REIT equals $1,358 
while a dollar-equivalent trade in comparable publicly-traded REITs 
costs $29.95. Industry representatives counter with the argument 
that the costs of raising capital through broker-dealer networks 
exceed the costs of bringing in money through traditional channels 
(Johnson, 2003). 
 Redemption policies and exit strategies. The unlisted REIT sponsors 
have come under criticisms for restrictive redemption policies and 
vague exit strategies. The issue of viable exit strategies has, however, 
been mitigated to a large extent by the successful public listing by 
Inland Real Estate Company (IRC). 
 Fixed share prices. Fixed share prices are listed above as a feature 
marketed to investors as a benefit. We argue that the fixed share 
price feature more rightly belongs in the list of unattractive features. 
As we show in the subsequent analysis, continuingly offering shares 
at a fixed offer price throughout the investment cycle has significant 
adverse economic consequences for long-term investors. 
 
2.1 Perverse dividend policy 
 How dividend policy influences the value of firms and cost of equity 
capital remains one of the more interesting areas of intellectual inquiry in 
financial economics. Because REITs operate under regulatory constraints 
regarding dividend payout, REIT data has been used quite frequently to test 
corporate dividend policy hypotheses [7]. Corgel et al. (1995), from a review 
of the early literature, finds insufficient evidence to conclude that the 
dividend-related regulatory constraints distort REIT valuations. The unique 
controls that the regulated REIT market provides, however, continues to 
promote research on the subjects of corporate dividends and taxes [8]. Two 
studies since 1995 specifically address differential dividend payout ratios 
among REITs. First, Bradley et al. (1998) presents evidence that REIT payout 
ratios are low with higher expected cash flow volatility in accordance with 
information-based explanations for dividend policy. In the second paper, 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2006) tests the hypothesis that ineffective management 
with respect to share price growth offer higher dividends to appease 
disgruntled investors. They find that corporate performance explains 
dividend payout and yield. 
 None of the traditional explanations for the relatively high dividends 
paid by unlisted REITs during recent years fit the investment circumstances 
surrounding the emergence of these firms. Insufficient time has passed in the 
life of unlisted REITs for investors to effectively evaluate either cash flow 
volatility or the ability of management to increase the values of asset 
portfolios. We are left with an explanation that the dividend policies of 
unlisted REITs derive from motives related to rapid asset growth, system fee 
generation, and the need for a defense mechanism against wealth transfer 
created by the fixed-share price structure. 
 
3. Modeling the problem of fixed share prices and wealth transfer 
 Our model captures how long-term investors who buy unlisted REIT 
shares with fixed offer prices are affected by the opportunistic actions of 
follow-on investors. Long-term investors in the model remain passive, buying 
shares of the unlisted REIT at origination and holding them until the unlisted 
REIT executes an exit either by liquidating in the private market, listing on a 
public exchange, or merging with another company. Follow-on investors 
behave in active ways, choosing whether or not to buy shares at a fixed offer 
price after properties held by the Unlisted REIT experience changes in values. 
Structuring the model in this way allows us to concentrate on the factors that 
enter into follow-on investors’ decisions and isolate how their trading affects 
long-term investors’ return on unlisted REIT investments. 
 
3.1 Model timeline 
 Our two-date model (t = 0 and t = 1) includes a group of long-term 
investors who buy shares in an unlisted REIT at t = 0 and a group of follow-on 
investors who have the opportunity to buy shares at t = 1. Table I presents 
the investment timeline. Referring to Table I, one can think of the interval 
between the beginning of t = 0 and the end of t = 1 as a multi-year period 
over which dividends and real estate returns accumulate. 
At t = 0, the unlisted REIT sells n0 shares at a price p0 per share to long-term 
investors, raising total gross proceeds of n0p0. After unlisted REIT affiliates 
and soliciting dealers are paid selling, service, and acquisition fees equal to f 
percent of gross proceeds, net proceeds of (1 - f )n0p0 are invested in real 
estate. 
 Between t = 0 and t = 1, real estate generates a market return 
represented by the distribution ?̃?, which is publicly known at t = 0. The 
realized return: 
 is publicly known at t = 1, denotes the realization of ?̃?. The real 
estate return represents a combination of operating cash flow and either 
capital gain or loss between t = 0 and t = 1. We also assume that between t = 
0 and t = 1, long-term investors accrue dividends, payable at t = 1, at a rate of 
d percent of their original investment. 
 At t = 1, real estate generates a rate of return r, resulting in unlisted 
REIT assets of (1 + r)(1 - f)n0p0 before dividends to investors. The unlisted REIT 
pays cumulative 
Table I: Model Timeline 
 
dividends to long-term investors equal to d percent of their original 
investment of n0p0, implying a total dividend payment of dn0p0. Follow-on 
investors are given the opportunity to invest in the unlisted REIT at a price of 
p1 per share. Denoting the number of shares purchased by follow-on 
investors as 𝑛1, the total additional investment proceeds after accounting for 
initial fees equals (1 - f )n1p1. Thus, after accounting for dividends and net 
additional investment, the value of unlisted REIT assets equals [ (1 + r)(1 — f) 
— d] n0p0 + (1 - f)n1p1 and the intrinsic value per outstanding share at t = 1, 
𝑝1
∗, is: 
Finally, to bring closure to the model, all investors receive the intrinsic value 
per outstanding share at t = 1, p, when the unlisted REIT executes an exit. 
 
3.2 Implications of a fixed offer price 
 In the analysis that follows, we show that the current industry 
standard of selling unlisted REIT shares at a fixed offer price has important 
implications for follow-on investors’ decisions, and ultimately influences the 
returns of long-term investors. Selling unlisted REIT shares at a fixed offer 
price means that the t = 0 offer price equals the t = 1 offer price, p0 = p1, and 
equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
 
 
Follow-on investors earn excess profits when the fixed offer price is less than 
the intrinsic t = 1 value of a share: 
 
 
 
Using equations (2) and (3), we obtain the inequality describing the 
conditions under which follow-on investors earn a realized return on the 
unlisted REIT’s real estate in excess of dividends and net of fees: 
The left-hand side of equation (4) is increasing in/, the initial fee percentage 
paid out to unlisted REIT affiliates and soliciting dealers, and in d, the 
cumulative dividend percentage paid out to long-term investors. Intuitively 
for the unlisted REIT to offer returns in excess of dividends to follow-on 
investors, real estate must generate returns that exceed the fees and 
dividends it pays out. 
  
3.3 Follow-on investors’ investment decision and long-term investors’ profit  
 Now, we analyze how follow-on investor decisions affect long-term 
investor profits. Follow-on investors’ profit from trading, pF, is the difference 
between the intrinsic value of shares bought and share offer price: 
 
Given the assumption of a fixed offer price such that p0 = p1, equation (2) can 
be combined with equation (5) to give follow-on investors’ profit: 
 
Long-term investors’ profit,  , includes a gain or loss on the shares held 
and the dividends received: 
 
By substituting the intrinsic value of shares at t = 1 under the fixed offer price 
assumption given by equation (2) into equation (7), we obtain the expanded 
form for long-term investors’ profit: 
 
Profit is a function of the number of shares bought by follow-on investors. At 
the time of follow-on investors’ decision, all variables in equation (8) are 
determined except n1. Thus, the opportunities and constraints regarding the 
purchase of shares facing follow-on investors’ become critical to long-term 
investors’ ultimate profit. We consider alternative assumptions about these 
opportunities and constraints in the next section. 
 Throughout this analysis, we supplement the general model with 
numerical values to clarify intuition. Recall that in practice several years may 
elapse between the unlisted REIT’s startup at t = - and exit at t = 1. The 
economic magnitude of the parameter values in our numerical example are 
meant to reflect a several-year period over which dividends and real estate 
returns accrue. We assume that the real estate return distribution, g(r), is 
uniform and that the following parameter values apply (see Table II). 
 
4. Investment behaviors of follow-on investors 
We show above that long-term investors’ profit is a function of the number 
of shares bought by follow-on investors, n1. We consider two scenarios: 
prohibited follow-on investment, and profit maximization under perfectly 
competitive follow-on investment. In the subsequent analysis of the two 
scenarios, we denote the equilibrium values of n1 as m and n1, respectively. 
 
4.1 Follow-on investment is prohibited 
The standard for comparison occurs when the unlisted REIT prohibits new 
investment at t = 1 (i.e. a closed-end fund). Without follow-on investment, n1 
= 0 and profit equations (6) and (8) reduce to: 
 
The expected profit to long-term investors is computed as: 
 
Substituting in the values from the numerical example, long-term investors’ 
expected profit is E = $237.50, which translates to a 23.75 percent expected 
return on their $1,000 initial investment (i.e. 100 shares at $10 each). The 
$237.50 expected profit serves as a benchmark for the numerical analysis 
when follow-on investment is allowed. 
 Figure 2 shows long-term investors’ return, pieL/n0p0, as a function of 
the real estate return, r. The slope is (1 — f) = 90 percent over the entire 
range from r = — 25percent to r = 100percent. Thus, after deducting the 
initial fees of f = 10 percent paid to unlisted REIT affiliates and soliciting 
dealers, long-term investors participate fully in the performance of the real 
estate regardless of how properties perform. 
Table II: The Parameter Values  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Long-Term Investors’ Return under Prohibited Follow-on Investment   
 
 
4.2 Perfectly competitive follow-on investment 
 Perfect competition assumes unrestricted entry among follow-on 
investors. When real estate performs poorly and the inequality in equation 
(4) does not hold for n1 = 0, the offer price exceeds the intrinsic value of 
shares and follow-on investors do not buy shares. Thus, when real estate 
performs poorly, the profit equations are identical to those in equations (9), 
(10), and (11) when follow-on investment is prohibited. 
 When real estate performs well and the inequality in equation (4) 
holds for n1 = 0, the intrinsic value of shares exceeds the offer price and 
follow-on investors buy shares. Perfectly competitive follow-on investors 
continue to invest provided that the intrinsic value of the next share 
purchased exceeds the fixed offer price. That is: 
 
Differentiating the intrinsic value of shares given by equation (2) with respect 
to n1, we obtain: 
 
When the inequality in equation (4) holds for n1 = 0, r $ j— and the intrinsic 
value of shares declines as the number of shares bought by follow-on 
investors increases. Taken together, equations (12) and (13) imply that 
follow-on investors continue to buy shares until the intrinsic value of shares 
equals the offer price: 
 
Using equations (2) and (14), we solve for n1: 
    
 
Finally, substituting equation (15) into equations (6) and (8), we obtain 
relations describing follow-on investors’ and long-term investors’ profits 
when the inequality in equation (4) holds: 
 
 
 
 
The expected profit to long-term investors can be computed using equations 
(4), (10), and (17): 
 
 Substituting in the values from the numerical example into equation (18), the 
expected payoff to long-term investors is = $66.67, which translates 
to a 6.67 percent expected return on their $1,000 initial investment. 
Recognize that long-term investors’ expected profit is less than when follow-
on investment is prohibited:  The difference, 
 represents the money long-term investors 
expect to forfeit to the selling, service, and acquisition fees charged by 
unlisted REIT affiliates and soliciting dealers on sales of shares to follow-on 
investors. These expected fees are equal to: 
 
creating an incentive for unlisted REIT affiliates and soliciting dealers to 
perpetuate the fixed-offer-price feature, despite any negative effects on long-
term investors. 
 Figure 3 shows long-term investors’ return under perfectly 
competitive follow-on investment, πL/n0p0, as a function of the realized real 
estate return, r. The slope is (1 - f) = 90percent for r ≤ f + d/1 - f = 
31.1percent, implying that after deducting initial fees, long-term investors 
participate fully when real estate performs poorly. However, the slope is zero 
for r > f + d/1 - f = 31.1percent, meaning that long-term investors do not 
participate beyond their contractual dividend when real estate performs well. 
The maximum periodic return that long-term investors can hope for is d = 18 
percent, the cumulative dividend paid by the unlisted REIT. The return in 
excess of the dividend, represented by the shaded area, is transferred from 
long-term investors to unlisted REIT affiliates and soliciting dealers in the 
form of fess paid on sales of shares to follow-on investors. Thus, follow-on 
investment creates a return asymmetry for long-term investors. When real 
estate performs poorly, long-term investors participate fully in the losses, but 
when real estate returns are strongly positive, long-term investors do not 
participate in gains beyond dividends promised by the unlisted REIT.
Figure 3: Long-term investor return with perfectly competitive investment  
 
 
4.3 Dividends and wealth transfer 
 The level of the dividend yield plays a significant role in determining 
the magnitude of the wealth transfer from long-term investors to unlisted 
REIT affiliates and soliciting dealers. Focusing on the differential impact of the 
dividend on the wealth transfer, we take the partial derivative of equation 
(19) with respect to d and obtain: 
  
 Equation (20) implies that the wealth transfer decreases as the 
dividend increases. To see how the dividend affects the magnitude of the 
wealth transfer, consider the shaded area in Figure 3. As we increase the 
dividend from the 18 percent in our numerical example, the inflection point 
moves up and to the right and the shaded area becomes smaller. If, for 
example, we increase the dividend yield from 18 to 24 percent, the expected 
wealth transfer given by equation (19) decreases from $170.83 to $139.38 
and long-term investors’ expected profit given by equation (18) increases 
from $66.67 to $98.12. Increasing the dividend further to 30 percent 
decreases the expected wealth transfer to $111.11 and increases long-term 
investors’ expected profit to $126.39. The fixed-price feature of the unlisted 
REIT structure thus creates perverse dividend policies. Specifically, the long-
term investors’ losses can be mitigated by relatively high contractual 
dividends. We discuss our model’s dividend implication and the empirical 
evidence in the next section. 
 
5. Empirical evidence of dividend policy distortion 
 In this section we provide evidence that the unlisted REIT structure 
leads to perverse dividend policies. These policies produce dividends well 
above comparable listed REITs and, more importantly, in excess of 100 
percent of FFO. All data come from SNL Securities and cover the three-year 
period 2003 through 2005[9]. Prior to 2003, the unlisted REIT data were not 
considered adequate to form broad enough cross-sections by firm size and 
property type. Table III presents the sample of 11 unlisted REITs. All of these 
companies were started after 1995 and represent every major property type. 
Total asset size ranges from well under $1 billion to $8 billion. Unfortunately, 
dividend information is not available for all unlisted REITs during each year. 
 The comparative analysis of unlisted REIT and listed REIT dividend 
dividends during the sample period begins with the formation of four shadow 
portfolios. The first portfolio (i.e. sector portfolio) consists of 41 listed REITs 
spanning every property type represented in the unlisted REIT sample. The 
firms were selected to achieve a balance by asset size. A list of these REITs 
and the REITs placed in other shadow portfolios appears in Table IV. To 
 eliminate age bias, a second shadow portfolio (i.e. IPO portfolio) was formed 
that includes 23 firms with IPOs after 1996. This portfolio also is balanced by 
property type and asset size. Finally, we assembled two similarly balanced 
portfolios of differing sizes (i.e. small size and large size). The small size 
portfolio has 17 REITs with NAVs falling in the range of $400 million to $700 
million and the large size portfolio consists of 30 firms with NAVs ranging 
from $1.2 billion to $3 billion. 
 Table V provides comparisons of average dividend payout as a 
percent of FFO across the unlisted and listed REIT portfolios during 2003, 
2004, and 2005. The 
 
Table III: Unlisted REIT sample  
 
dividend payout ratios for listed REITs fall within a normal range for REITs of 
between 60 and 75 percent (Farrell, 2006). Average payout ratios for the 
sample of unlisted REITs not only exceeded those of listed REITs by a sizeable 
margin, but were greater than 100 percent during all three years. This means 
that unlisted REITs paid out more in dividends than they received in cash flow 
over a three year period. Logic dictates that such a perverse dividend policy is 
unsustainable. 
 
 6. Conclusion 
 The idea to provide Federal tax-exempt status to business trusts that 
invest in commercial real estate became law in 1960 due to the efforts of a 
diverse group of special industry and government interests (Lynn and 
Bloomfield, 2003). Beyond the motivations of these groups to increase capital 
flows for real estate investment and rehabilitation was the intent of making 
available to retail investors certain advantages previously reserved for 
investors with greater resources. These advantages include diversification 
through pooling of funds, access to the benefits of professional investment 
advisors, and the ability to collectively finance properties of a scale that most 
individual investors could not undertake by themselves (Fass etal, 2004). As 
the REIT market matured, firms became larger and more public. Average 
investors seeking these opportunities had to enter the public securities 
environment, which they may neither find familiar nor trust. 
 Recognizing that a segment of the retail investor population was not 
comfortable with prevailing commercial real estate investment options, 
sponsors of unlisted REITs reached retail investors through existing broker-
dealer channels to provide an alternative way of accessing institutional grade 
real estate portfolios. The programs of unlisted REIT sponsors, therefore, 
directly align with the spirit of the original US REIT legislation. In addition, 
these programs demonstrated substantial appeal as evidenced by the 
amount of capital flowing to unlisted REIT sponsors during recent years 
through broker-dealer networks. 
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 Table IV (continued) 
  During the initial phase in the maturation of unlisted REITs, critics 
emphasized the size of the fees earned by participants in the broker-dealer 
network and the integrity of sponsors. As market conditions change, 
investors’ holding periods lengthen, and the exit strategies of unlisted REITs 
come to fruition, closer scrutiny is being directed to more general problems, 
such as conflict-of-interest issues and structural problems of the investment 
programs. In this paper we identify one structural flaw present in unlisted 
REIT investment programs - the fixed share price. Our model provides a 
mechanism for analyzing the consequences of fixed share prices on fees 
generated through the broker-dealer network and the profits and returns 
received by both long-term (i.e. those who invest early) and opportunistic 
follow-on (i.e. those who enter late) investor groups. 
 The model solutions using a fixed share price assumption provide 
several insights. First, opportunistic follow-on investors participate only 
during up real estate markets as the intrinsic values of shares rise above fixed 
share prices. Second, during periods of rising property values and with 
perfectly competitive capital markets, follow-on investors will buy shares as 
long as intrinsic share value exceeds fixed share price, driving long-term 
investors’ profit to the level of dividends. Profits in excess of dividends are 
absorbed by participants in the broker-dealer network. Third, a high 
contractual dividend level can be used to mitigate the wealth transfer from 
long-term investors. A comparative analysis of the dividend payout behaviors 
of listed and unlisted REITs during recent years reveals that unlisted REITs 
have paid dividends relative to FFO well in excess of listed REITs and also 
approximately 110 percent of their own FFOs. This perverse dividend policy 
follows from the fixed-share price structure adopted by these firms. 
The basic structure of unlisted REITs has many desirable features and should 
be preserved, but with modification to the fixed share price feature to limit 
investor conflicts. A convenient parallel to unlisted REIT unit investment in 
commercial real estate is the commingled fund (see Fosheim, 1995). Ennis 
(1996) describes the institutional arrangement as follows: 
In a straightforward process each asset in the commingled fund is 
appraised periodically. The value of the properties are then added 
together to arrive at the value for the fund. As properties change in 
value, the fund value is adjusted. Commingled fund values are quoted 
as if the properties were sold at appraised value (at least on average 
across the properties in the fund)... Intrinsic value is determined only 
 by the asset appraisal methodology controlled by the fund manager 
(p. 36). 
Table V: Dividend payouts of unlisted REITs and shadow portfolios of listed 
REITs, 2003-2005 
 
 
Analysts following publicly-traded REITs use simpler and less costly NAV 
calculations (relative to appraisals) to mark the values of REIT assets to 
market. Regardless of the approach taken, the unlisted REIT business model 
needs adjustment to avoid the undesirable consequences arising from fixed 
offer pricing. 
 
Notes 
1. The private REIT category includes a variety of different types of 
companies whose sponsors elect REIT status. Many of these companies are 
small, do not rely on broker-dealer networks to raise capital, and do not 
register with the SEC. Unlisted REITs represent a special category of private 
REITs. These companies satisfy SEC reporting requirements as if the shares 
are publicly traded and rely more heavily than other non-traded REITs on 
broker-dealer networks. In most instances, unlisted REIT sponsors choose this 
mode of operation to prepare for an IPO or exchange listing in the future. 
One of the large unlisted REITs, inland (IRC), listed during 2004 and another 
firm, CNL hospitality, had an unsuccessful IPO during 2004. 
2. During the five-year period ending in December 2003, unlisted REITs raised 
$13 billion of equity while publicly-traded REITs raised $22 billion. The 
majority of the sales of unlisted REIT shares were by a few of these 
companies, such as CNL and Wells. 
3. For an overview of TIC investment, see Napoli (2005). 
 4. Inland, for example, initially offered shares at $10 then raised the price to 
$11. Within months after trading began in June 2004, the shares of Inland 
stabilized at an approximate price of $16. 
5. Reviews of the REIT literature by Corgel et al. (1995) and a recent update 
by Zietz et al. (2003) contain no mention of unlisted REITs. 
6. Among other actions taken in preparation for exchange listing, unlisted 
REITs may convert from externally managed to internally managed 
companies. 
7. The REIT Modernization Act of 1999 changed the dividend requirement to 
90 percent of taxable income beginning in 2001 from the previous 
requirement of 95 percent. Some listed REITs payout more than 100 percent 
of taxable income, but typically do not payout more than 70 percent of FFO. 
8. For a recent study of dividend taxes and corporate valuations that controls 
for exogenous factors through the use of REIT data (see Gentry et al., 2003). 
9. As mentioned earlier, unlisted follow SEC reporting requirements despite 
not having publicly traded stock. Hence SNL is able assemble data on these 
firms to track their performance. 
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